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____________________________________________ 
Legitimacy is recognized as critical to the success of international 
administrations in their efforts to build and promote peace, stability and 
welfare in post-conflict territories. Nonetheless, scholarship on state-building 
is dominated by the ‘managerial’ approach, which offers a top-down analysis 
of policies by international actors and their impact on local constituencies. 
With its focus on the grassroots, the individual and multiplicity of concerns, a 
human security perspective on international administration can identify and 
address their legitimacy gap, resulting in strategies for more effective conflict-
resolution. The argument is illustrated by analysis of the Ahtisaari process and 
plan for Kosovo’s final status.   
___________________________________________ 
  
Legitimacy is critical to the success of international administrations. Their 
effectiveness in post-conflict territories is judged on the impact of their policies 
in building and promoting peace, stability and welfare. Nonetheless, this 
impact is not necessarily a measure of success; legitimacy is. Specifically, a 
more accurate yardstick for the success of an international administration’s 
mandate, mission and policies in a war-torn territory is its degree of 
acceptance by the people it governs. The importance of legitimacy for 
international efforts has been recognized in state-building scholarship. 
However, legitimacy has been studied mainly in terms of the mandates of 
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outside interveners and the implications of their policies rather than in terms of 
their acceptance.  
 
This article reverses the perspective by adopting a human security 
approach. With its focus on individuals, it challenges the concept of 
community and territory as the cornerstones of analysis. ‘People-
centeredness’, favoured by human security, informs a bottom-up perspective. 
The consequence is the expansion of security concerns to include issues of 
welfare. When applied to international administrations as a form of conflict 
resolution, the human security perspective furthers an understanding of the 
legitimacy gap. This argument is backed up by analysis here of the Ahtisaari 
process and plan for Kosovo’s final status. Based on fieldwork conducted in 
Kosovo and analysis of the Albanian, Serbian and Kosovo Serb press, as well 
as relevant documents, the article demonstrates the legitimacy deficits of the 
process and proposed solution. It highlights future points of contention that 
may ultimately decide the legitimacy of international involvement in 
independent Kosovo. 
  
 
Human Security and Conflict Resolution 
 
Human security is a paradigm-shifting concept. At its core is a change of 
focus from a state-centred understanding of security, that is, top-down and 
territorial, to an individual-based and therefore bottom-up and de-territorialized 
model. It is informed by questions: security for whom; of what values; from 
what threats; and by what means?1 However, the quest for an agreed 
definition is still on since the publication in 1994 of a seminal UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) report that set the terms of the human security debate. 
The concept encompasses a range of perspectives, from minimalist to 
maximalist, from a narrow ‘freedom from fear’ approach to a broader ‘freedom 
from want’ emphasis. The fear-based approach stresses the issue of life; the 
want-based emphasises subsistence and, ultimately, dignity. Key actors, 
proponents and documents advancing the human security agenda are 
positioned on this scale.  
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According to Sabina Alkire, the diversity of definitions of human 
security reflects differences in perceived advantage to the implementing 
institution or country, resulting in emphases on different elements, dimensions 
and thresholds.2 The practice of human security has resulted in narrow 
institutional appropriations of the concept, sidelining the principle of bottom-up 
security provision and working through the state instead. Kanti Bajpai argues 
that ‘state security is for individual security,’ as the state’s security cannot be 
the end of security but a means to it.3 This has led some scholars, such as 
Neil Cooper, emphasise a bottom-up approach by introducing subjective 
security understood in terms of engagement with ‘the poor, the voiceless and 
the marginalised’.4  
The critique of human security has grown in parallel with efforts to 
conceptualize it. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha Chenoy have 
identified five types: conceptual (deriving from the definitional issue); 
analytical (questioning its appropriateness within existing academic 
disciplines, primarily international relations); political implications (related to 
the implications for state sovereignty); moral implications (tied to perpetuation 
of global divisions); and implementation (in terms of bridging rhetoric and 
policy).5 Responding to criticism that the concept of human security is too 
comprehensive and therefore of limited policy value,6 scholars have 
addressed the issue of actors, capabilities and the global infrastructure 
required for the delivery of human security.7 The interest in policy prescription 
is particularly relevant in the area of conflict resolution and state-building.  
Human security has been defined as more than an absence of conflict. 
Yet, surprisingly, the human security agenda has more to say about pre-
conflict and post-conflict stages than it does on the approach to conflict itself. 
The emphasis on non-traditional threats, such as poverty, inequality, human 
rights abuses and disease as potential triggers of conflict underpins the 
human security preventive agenda. By contrast, the stress on comprehensive 
peacebuilding, incorporating development as well as human rights, has 
defined a human security post-conflict approach. But what about the conflict 
itself; and, more particularly, conflict resolution?  
According to Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, a narrow conflict resolution 
approach, that is, a political approach, itself creates security gaps. Therefore, 
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with its comprehensive approach, which includes human rights and 
development as well as political processes, human security is a value-adding 
concept.8 While the human security approach has allowed for the bridging of 
the political, developmental and human rights agendas for pre- and post-
conflict situations, the bottom-up political agenda itself has not received 
sufficient critical scrutiny. Similarly, in the context of conflict resolution, the 
definition of the ‘political’ has by and large been reserved for the state level, 
as embodied by the political elite, or the sub-state level, reflecting a group’s 
political aspiration. In sum, conflict resolution has been defined by a collective, 
rather than an individual, approach. Therefore, the importance of the bottom-
up processes and the necessity of multi-track conflict resolution have been 
highlighted.9  
Sascha Werthes and Tobias Debiel point out that human security 
‘offers a normative reference point for evaluating and orientating policies and 
political instruments: the security and protection of the individual’.10 In other 
words, human security allows for unpacking the bottom-up political dimension 
as well as recognizing the multiplicity of security concerns.11 Such approach 
to international administration can identify and address the legitimacy gap, 
resulting in strategies for more effective conflict resolution. 
 
 
International Administrations: The Bottom-up Approach to the 
Legitimacy Gap 
 
 
The legitimacy gap has been recognized as an Achilles’ heel of international 
administrations (IAs).12 Also known as interim or civil administrations, 
international protectorates or neotrusteeships, IAs represent external 
interventions of a comprehensive nature in the aftermath of conflict and state 
failure, with the aim of facilitating the creation of inclusive, functional and 
sustainable states.13 State-building thus facilitated is envisaged as an ultimate 
answer to conflict in the age of global (in)security.14  
From Bosnia and Herzegovina to Timor–Leste, Kosovo and 
Afghanistan, the comprehensive nature of these interventions, including 
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democratic institution building, civil society assistance, economic 
development, human rights promotion, reckoning with war crimes and so on, 
corresponds closely to key human security concerns. At the same time, the 
practice of IAs violates one of the key tenets of human security: the bottom-up 
perspective. There is an inherent contradiction in external state-building 
efforts, as they are premised on the appropriation of local ownership for the 
sake of crafting local democracy and building local capacity.15 Critics have 
addressed this contradiction in terms of a legitimacy gap.  
Legitimacy derives from the nation-state framework, with a 
straightforward juxtaposition of the ruler and the ruled. The increasingly 
transnational and multilateral quality of post-cold war politics has triggered a 
debate on normative, empirical and procedural aspects of legitimacy above a 
nation state. 16 IAs embody the complexity of global politics. They involve 
multiple stakeholders: international organisations, nation states with distinct 
preferences held by their governments and publics, as well as local 
populations with their own political and ethnic diversity. Therefore, viewed 
through the prism of the nation state, international administrations provide an 
innately anomalous context for the generation of legitimacy. The 
undemocratic exercise of authority is supplanted by rational assent and 
conviction to norms and principles elicited by effective communication.17 The 
adaptation of the ‘input-oriented’ legitimacy (based on a sense of identity and 
community), to rational reasoning, enhances the significance of the ‘output-
oriented’ legitimacy, based on the capacity to solve problems.18   
The discussion of legitimacy in the state-building literature reflects a 
wider theoretical challenge – conceptualizing legitimacy in a transnational 
context. Scholars have addressed the issue of sites where legitimacy is 
generated, grounds on which it is founded, and the process by which it is 
produced and contested. William Bain rejects the legitimacy of contemporary 
trusteeships as a form of paternalism, because human dignity and equality, as 
values that define international society, are at odds with the idea of 
trusteeship.19 David Chandler modifies Michael Ignatieff’s ‘neo-imperial’ 
argument20 into an ‘empire in denial’ proposition. State-building – including by 
IAs – is, according to Chandler, an intrusive and contradictory form of 
international control. It simultaneously assumes the denial of power and 
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evasion of the responsibility of power.21 Sally Morphet contends that the 
political legitimacy of civil administrations, like the effective execution of their 
mandates, correlates with their compliance with the international legal 
standards and norms on which they are based.22 Similarly, Dominik Zaum 
conceptualises sovereignty as responsibility, assessing its impact on the 
policies and authority of state builders.23 
Insofar as it addresses the legitimacy gap in terms of ambiguous 
international mandates, ineffective capacity-building, creation of political, 
economic and cultural dependence and inadequate conflict resolution, the 
state-building literature has been dominated by the ‘managerial’ approach. It 
provides a top-down view of policies undertaken by international actors, and 
therefore of their impact. Consequently, it denies agency and voice to the 
local constituency, which is hardly ever brought into the analysis in the 
existing scholarship.24 Yet at the core of legitimacy is a notion of acceptance 
of, and belief in, the political decisions and the political order.25 Distinguishing 
between ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ legitimacy, Benrhard Knoll highlights 
the significance of local consent for the discursive and governance aspects of 
domestic legitimation of international administrators.26  
This is a welcome change of perspective – from legitimacy as the 
analysis of the rationales, mandates and policies of international 
administrators, to legitimacy constructed through the views of those on whose 
behalf they govern. Only in Timor–Leste, unlike in the Balkan involvements, 
was the mission obliged in its mandate to consult with local actors. 
Chesterman points out the key role of local consultations in the day-to-day 
governance of the territory,27 while Zaum emphasizes the importance of local 
knowledge for effective governance.28 The High Representative in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Miroslav Lajcak, has introduced a personal blog as a 
mechanism for direct consultation with the local population.  
The acknowledgement of local consultations and their beneficial impact 
for the legitimacy of IAs, however, stops short of addressing the nature of the 
local constituency and the grounds on which legitimacy can be built. With 
hidden agendas, competing interests and cross-border links, these are critical 
but not self-evident, particularly in a post-conflict context. Béatrice Pouligny 
warns against seeing ‘local societies as a shapeless, homogenous, static 
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whole’.29 During and after the conflict, she argues, political, economic and 
military entrepreneurs as well as indigenous civil societies, including formal 
social organizations and religious and community networks, are involved in 
fluid, cross-cutting and interconnected networks whose politics, interests and 
perspectives are not necessarily deducible from their position in the local 
political order.30 Such disconnection has unexpected local consequences, 
such as elected representatives not being recognized as the best guardians 
and representatives of people’s interests.  
The article first details the Ahtisaari process and its background. It 
goes on to discuss the legacies of the UN Mission in Kosovo’s (UNMIK’s) rule, 
which shape the perception of the Ahtisaari package. Finally, it provides a 
human security perspective on the settlement.  
 
The Path to Kosovo’s Final Status  
 
The NATO intervention in 1999 ended Serbian repression in Kosovo, but not 
the Serbian–Albanian long-standing contest over status. UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244 authorized the UN civilian administration to operate in the 
territory, alongside NATO’s security presence, for an unspecified interim 
period pending the final settlement. The international community was 
overwhelmed by the challenges posed by a combination of post-conflict 
reconstruction and post-Communist transition. The outbreak of violence in 
March 2004, rather than the substantial headway made in preparing the 
province for self-rule, precipitated steps towards finalizing the status of 
Kosovo. As the Albanian majority turned on the minorities, 19 people were 
killed and thousands displaced, while private property and cultural heritage 
sites, including a number of Orthodox churches and shrines, were destroyed. 
The prospect of further instability caused by pent-up frustration over the 
unresolved status galvanized the international community.  
The final status talks, chaired by the UN envoy and former Finnish 
President, Martti Ahtisaari, began in Vienna in February 2006. The Albanians 
entered the process insisting on independence, the Serbs on unspecified 
substantial autonomy for Kosovo. Due to such diametrically opposed views 
the talks focused on non-status issues: decentralization, cultural heritage, 
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community rights and economic matters. The futility of 17 rounds of talks over 
14 months led to a change of strategy in March 2007. Ahtisaari stated 
unequivocally that the potential for negotiations was ‘exhausted’.31 Later that 
month came a move signalling the imposition of a solution, when Ahtisaari 
submitted his settlement proposal to the Security Council. A detailed outline of 
the internal governance architecture of the future independent Kosovo and of 
international supervision in the form of civilian and military presence was 
accompanied with a report that said: ‘The only viable option for Kosovo is 
independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international 
community.’32  
The plan itself has two key characteristics. The first is its 
communitarian and territorial approach, and the second is the nature of 
supervision. In order to address the Serbian question in Kosovo, the 
community rights approach is expressed through institutional and territorial 
arrangements for the Serbs vis-à-vis the Albanian majority. The territorial 
aspect envisages the creation of Serb-majority municipalities. The plan 
sanctions cooperation between the Serb-majority municipalities, as well as 
their cooperation with the institutions in Serbia. 33 It also includes the creation 
of Protective Zones around Serbian Orthodox heritage.34 In sum, the plan 
relied on the weight of group rights and new municipal borders to address 
Serb insecurities and co-opt the Serbs into accepting an independent Kosovo.  
The second feature is the nature of supervision of Kosovo’s 
independence, which is embodied in the authority vested in the International 
Civilian Office (ICO) in Kosovo. One of the responsibilities of the International 
Civilian Representative, as a part of overseeing the implementation of the 
settlement, was to be ‘the final authority regarding the interpretation of the 
civilian aspects’, annulling legislation by the Kosovo authorities and even 
sanctioning or removing from office any public official.35 In effect, the ICO was 
modelled after the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, whose powers to override the local legislative decisions and rule 
by decree have, since 1995, illustrated the pitfalls of building democracy by 
undemocratic means.36 
The adoption of the Ahtisaari package by the UN Security Council in 
the spring of 2007 was blocked by Russia’s opposition to a non-negotiated 
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and imposed solution; which ultimately led to another 120 days of negotiations 
under the auspices of the Contact Group in the autumn as a concession to the 
negotiated approach. Its failure paved the way for the alternative, backed by 
the United States and the majority of the EU, of a ‘coordinated’ declaration of 
independence by Kosovo Albanians,37 which came on 17 February 2008. The 
Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, adopted by the Kosovo Parliament, 
specifically refers to the Ahtisaari plan, and spells out Kosovo Albanians’ full 
acceptance of the obligations for Kosovo envisaged by the plan and its 
proposed framework for the future administration of Kosovo.38 The Ahtisaari 
plan was ‘embedded’ in the constitution when it came into force on 15 June 
2008.39 
Before unpacking the bottom-up perspective, the article addresses two 
legacies of the intervention in Kosovo in order to contextualize grassroots 
views and their complexity. The record of UNMIK’s rule and Kosovo’s 
‘enclavization’ is critical for understanding the response to key features of the 
Ahtisaari settlement.  
 
 
The Shadow of UNMIK 
 
Three areas of its activity define the record of UNMIK’s rule in Kosovo: 
governance, political will and conflict resolution. These also affect the degree 
of acceptance of the future international administration. Kosovo’s president 
has already announced that the EU mission in Kosovo will not last as long as 
UNMIK’s.40  
The UNMIK administration, set up by the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244, was a de facto international government for Kosovo. The 
transfer of powers took place gradually – though not satisfactorily, for the 
Albanian constituency. Albanians considered the transfer of power, which 
began in May 2001, inadequate and too slow. The international administration 
reserved specified responsibilities in areas of monetary policy, external 
relations, customs and so on. This led not only to a sense of disempowerment 
of Kosovars, but also to a ‘war’ between the Kosovo Parliament and the 
international administrators over issues such as the border with Macedonia. 
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UNMIK’s reserved powers were a consequence of Kosovo’s unresolved final 
status. Nonetheless, they caused resentment, thus eroding UNMIK’s 
legitimacy.  
The Serbs also had their complaints about UNMIK and the international 
community in general. They have criticized a lack of progress in fulfilling the 
standards elaborated in the ‘Standards before Status’ policy. This approach, 
initiated in 2002, involved eight standards: functioning democratic institutions; 
the rule of law; freedom of movement; returns and reintegration; economic 
progress; property rights; dialogue with Belgrade and the Kosovo Protection 
Corps, with minority presentation. Despite its weaknesses,41 the policy had 
some impact as it was a condition for the resolution of Kosovo’s status.42 After 
the 2004 unrest and the launch of the UN process, the policy evolved into 
‘Standards with Status’. By that time, however, it had all but lost its 
credibility.43  
UNMIK was also criticized for ineffective economic governance, 
resulting in economic malaise and distorted development. Its credibility was 
challenged by its reluctance to confront the clandestine criminal structures. 
Originating before the conflict, they were further entrenched during it.44 
Albanians and Serbs have expected UNMIK, as an empowered and an 
impartial governor, to come to grips with them. But UNMIK’s failure to do so 
reinforced ‘the logic of the warlords’.45 Iain King and Whit Mason attribute this 
to UNMIK’s own lack of capacities, such as the inability to penetrate the 
criminal structures.46 By contrast, UNMIK’s strategy for the people of Kosovo 
was not the question of ability but of political will: UNMIK bought political 
stability by tolerating local criminal structures. The unhindered existence of 
shadow intelligence operations controlled by Albanian political parties and 
shadow security structures set up by Belgrade in Kosovo Serb communities 
illustrates this.  
Last, the UNMIK era in Kosovo has also been associated with the 
failure to resolve ethnic conflict. The conflict resolution strategy of 
guaranteeing minority rights to Kosovo Serbs, alongside other minority 
communities in Kosovo, proved largely ineffective. With the final status 
question pending, the Albanians’ case for independence was boosted by 
attempts, such as the setting of the multi-ethnic Parliament, to create a 
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functioning multi-ethnic society.47 Consequently, to Kosovo Serbs, and to 
Belgrade in particular, their participation in the Kosovo’s institutions was a 
step towards the fulfilment of the Albanians’ goal. The result, despite dissent 
among Kosovo Serbs, was to boycott Kosovo’s institutions and political life. 
Meanwhile, sporadic instances of inter-ethnic violence created a sense of 
enduring conflict.  
 
 
The Ethnic ‘Enclavization’ of Kosovo 
 
 
Enclavization has been the main feature of Kosovo’s ethnic landscape in the 
post-NATO intervention period. The withdrawal of Serbian security forces 
resulted in what has been described as a reverse ‘ethnic cleansing’.48 
Albanian revenge attacks against the remaining Serbs and their property 
created an atmosphere of insecurity, to which enclaves offered a solution. 
Enclavization heralded the ruralization of the Serbian community. In the post-
second world war period, the Serbs became a minority in all urban areas in 
Kosovo.49 After NATO’s intervention, Mitrovica, in the north of Kosovo, 
remained the only city with a significant number of Serbs. In Kosovo’s capital, 
Prishtina, the pre-war population of some 40,000 was reduced to the 
inhabitants of a single apartment block.  
There are six larger enclaves, and several dozen pockets, some of 
which comprise no more than 80 people.50 While Mitrovica is the largest 
single enclave, more Serbs live scattered in the enclaves south of the Ibar 
River, which divides Mitrovica into the Serbian north and Albanian south.51 
The Serb enclave in Mitrovica, is adjacent to Serbia, and is the only area in 
Kosovo where the Serb population grew after 1999, owing to the arrival of 
displaced persons from other areas in Kosovo. Enclavization has aggravated 
Serbian–Albanian relations in post-intervention Kosovo, especially in 
Mitrovica. Albanians saw enclaves as a blueprint for the unacceptable 
partition of Kosovo.  
Although enclaves are associated with mono-ethnicity, they are not 
islands of ethnic homogeneity. Even in Mitrovica, there are areas with an 
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Albanian population, such as the so-called Bosniak Mahala, several 
apartment blocks on a strip of land on the Serb side inhabited both by 
Albanians and Serbs. There is also a small multi-ethnic settlement to the north 
of Mitrovica. The Albanian inhabitants of villages on the border with Serbia are 
determined to remain there, even after the post-independence unrest in the 
area in February 2008.52  
The existence of geographically concentrated areas of Serbs in Kosovo 
has facilitated Serbia’s continued political presence in Kosovo. The Belgrade 
government has organized and funded parallel education, healthcare and civil 
services, as well as clandestine security structures in Kosovo.53 Further, 
Serbia’s political influence in Kosovo is extended through party politics. Nearly 
all the Serb political parties of Kosovo are branches of Serbian political 
parties, and their agendas are therefore set in Belgrade rather than in Kosovo. 
Still, the Belgrade government has failed to impose total control on Kosovo 
Serbs.  
The Serbian National Council (SNC), an unelected body gathering 
Serb political and religious leaders in Kosovo, is itself divided. The SNC’s 
Gračanica faction accepted the Serbs’ position within the ‘new Kosovo’; the 
SNC’s Mitrovica faction challenged it.54 These conflicting views translated into 
the former’s collaboration with UNMIK, and the latter’s defiance of it.55 The 
tensions and resulting contradictions in policy recommendations concerning, 
for example, participation in Kosovo elections, continued throughout the 
period of UNMIK rule, coming to a head after the declaration of independence 
in February 2008. The founding of indigenous Kosovo Serb parties, such as 
the Independent Liberal Party, reflects frustration with Belgrade policies often 
detrimental to Kosovo Serb interests.  
To sum up, both the UNMIK era in Kosovo and the ethnic-cum-
territorial distribution of Kosovo Serbs represent legacies that informed the 
critical assessment of key elements of the Ahtisaari plan at the grassroots 
level.  
 
 
The Ahtisaari Process and Plan from a Human Security Perspective  
 
 13 
 
What Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo have in common is that grassroots 
opinion was at odds with their own political elites in appraising the Ahtisaari 
plan. Discordant assessments reflected the fact that the Ahtisaari process 
was largely an elite process: both negotiating teams overlooked the concerns 
of ordinary people while prioritizing the issue of the statehood of Kosovo, that 
is, its borders and territory.  
 
The Albanians  
 
The Unity Team of the Albanian negotiators, representing cross-party 
interests, entered the process with one crucial objective: securing 
independence for Kosovo. Consequently, the team compromized on other 
aspects of the plan. On entering the process, Albanians were not given any 
explicit promises of independence. Nonetheless, independence for Kosovo 
was an assumed outcome.56 Key concessions concerned the 
institutionalization and territorialization of Serb rights on ethnic principle, even 
against their own better judgement. A member of the Unity Team feared that 
this would lead to the creation of ‘two separate political communities’.57 
However, this was seen as an acceptable price for Kosovo’s independence. 
Due to obstacles within the UN, the Ahtisaari plan was not accompanied by 
independence. Consequently, popular dissatisfaction surfaced over  
compromises made in the process.58 Key objections concerned ethnic 
decentralization, special zones for religious monuments and the nature of the 
international rule.   
The Albanians criticised the decentralization prescribed by the 
Ahtisaari plan on ethnic and functional grounds. With the legacy of Kosovo’s 
post-intervention enclavization in mind, ethnic decentralization was seen as a 
step towards further entrenchment of ethnic divisions. Of particular concern 
has been the division of Mitrovica into two ethnically-defined municipalities, 
albeit with a joint board. This provision is seen as a validation of the ethnic 
segregation in Mitrovica that has been maintained by paramilitary formations 
such as the infamous ‘Bridge Watchers’.59 The declaration of Kosovo’s 
independence has failed to assuage Albanian fears of Kosovo’s partition. The 
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institutionalization of the ethnic border in Mitrovica, in accordance with the 
Ahtisaari plan, is perceived as the introduction of an internal division of 
Kosovo and a challenge to the sovereignty of Kosovo on the entirety of its 
territory.60  
Furthermore, the opposition to new Serbian majority municipalities has 
been reinforced on practical grounds. As a result of the gerrymandering 
necessary to introduce Ahtisaari’s ethnic municipal borders, some citizens 
faced being cut off from their nearest municipal offices. The opinion of an 
Albanian from the village of Suhadoll/Suvi Do, previously a part of 
Lypjan/Lipljan municipality and about to become part of the Serb-majority 
Graçanica/Gračanica according to the Ahtisaari plan, is telling:  
 
It does not make sense that in the name of bringing government closer 
to the citizens, we are pushed to join a municipality 30km away from 
our village, while the municipality of Lypjan is on our doorstep, just 2km 
away. How can we live as part of a municipality that will be controlled 
directly by Belgrade? I don’t know if the politicians are aware that any 
project they attempt to realize without a ‘yes’ from the people is 
destined to fail.61 
 
Some improvement in inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo has been attributed to 
the Standards before Status process.62 By contrast, the separation of Serbs in 
their own municipalities under the Ahtisaari plan appears to contradict the 
previous policy. Local Albanian officials who worked on the integration of 
Serbs feel let down. Reaching out across the ethnic divide after the bloodshed 
of 1998–99 was a genuine challenge. Furthermore, in the traditional Albanian 
setting, implementation of the policy was a question of honour. One municipal 
leader said: ‘I staked my honour on engaging the Serbs, and now it is all 
being undone.’63  
Opposition to ethnic decentralization, that was clear during the 
negotiations, cuts across Albanian civil society. 64 In the post-independence 
period, the opposition has turned into resistance to the implementation of this 
part of the plan. Thus, the mayor of Gjilan/Gnjilane says it will be difficult to 
implement decentralization because it is unacceptable. Similarly, the division 
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of Mitrovica into two municipalities is turning into a test for the new 
international administrators.65 Like Serb-majority municipalities, Albanians 
have criticized the creation of Protective Zones for the Serb Orthodox heritage 
for demonstrating a lack of trust in the Albanians, and for, effectively, isolating 
these sites from the local communities.66 These objections also reflect 
Albanians’ sensitivity to the issue of space: the introduction of these zones is 
seen as an underhand way of removing territory from their control.67  
Last, both ordinary Albanians and their political leaders concur in their 
assessment of the nature of the international presence. The International 
Civilian Office represents a critical part of the Ahtisaari plan – defining the 
nature of the international supervision of Kosovo’s status. Nonetheless, 
according to a member of the Albanian negotiating team, the role and 
authority of the ICO was not even discussed with them. Reading the section 
of the plan referring to the ICO therefore came as a ‘complete shock’.68 The 
feelings in Albanian civil society are not dissimilar and are attributed to the 
lack of trust in the Albanians.69 Such views are reinforced by the culture of 
mistrust that is UNMIK’s legacy in Kosovo. 
Elements of the Ahtisaari plan have been contested because of a lack 
of consultation with the local elites, and the marginalization by local elites of 
grassroots concerns. According to one commentator, ‘this was a plan of the 
international community and not of Albanians. So, this plan was imposed on 
Kosovars – they had no other way but to accept it.’70 This is likely to adversely 
affect the plan’s implementation and the exercise of influence by the EU 
administrators in Kosovo.  
 
The Serbs 
 
Adopting a classic geopolitical approach that puts territory first and people 
second, the Belgrade leadership rejecting the Ahtisaari plan. Its failure was 
declared ‘the first and foremost state and national interest of Serbia’.71 Unlike 
them, Kosovo Serbs had an ambiguous stance towards the plan.  
Different opinions of the plan coincided with a political divide within the 
Serbian National Council. Kosovo Serbs have been inclined to reserve their 
dissenting opinions for themselves. This is because of the pressure they have 
 16 
faced from clandestine Serbian structures in Kosovo, in case they fall out of 
line with Belgrade.72 Nonetheless, especially south of the Ibar River, ‘people 
say that the Ahtisaari plan is basically acceptable, short of the first line’.73 ‘The 
first line’ is a reference to independence. Guarantees of group rights, 
combined with territorial reorganization of Kosovo along ethnic lines in the 
plan, were deemed credible. In fact, institutionalization and territorialization of 
ethnicity would allow each Serb enclave in Kosovo to become a ‘little 
Serbia’.74  
The official Serb rejection of the Ahtisaari plan has marginalized the 
dissenting opinion in the Kosovo Serb community. This is not unexpected, as 
Belgrade had dictated the agenda during the Vienna negotiations. A proposal 
by a Kosovo Serb moderate that Kosovo Serbs should represent the third 
delegation at the talks alongside Belgrade and Prishtina was dismissed.75 A 
token presence of Kosovo Serbs was allowed insofar as they endorsed 
Belgrade’s view. But the particular circumstances and interests of the Serbs 
south of the Ibar were not considered.76 According to Radmila Trajković, of 
the central Kosovo branch of the SNC, the Serbs in the enclaves ‘accepted 
the reality of being surrounded by Albanians as a dominant community. In 
order to survive they have been making a series of compromises, which in 
essence means a chance for life and for the future.’77 After the declaration of 
independence, they defied Belgrade’s orders to abandon any Kosovo 
institutions.78 The refusal of Kosovo Serb policemen in some areas, such as 
Shtërpci/Štrpci and Peja/Peć, to leave the Kosovo Police Service illustrates 
this.79 Establishment of the Serb Parliament in Kosovo has failed to elicit 
unanimous support locally.80 By contrast, support that local leaders in 
Mitrovica have received from Belgrade has resulted in a hardline position.81 
Staging post-independence riots, they rejected collaboration with UNMIK and 
the EU.  
While Kosovo Serbs did not support Kosovo’s independence, the 
absence of a mass ‘exodus’ and the refusal by some to toe Belgrade’s line 
after independence, indicate that many would find a way to live with it.82 When 
asked about their top priorities, Kosovo Serbs put Kosovo’s final status fourth, 
after regular electricity supply, public and personal security, and the return of 
the displaced and refugees.83 Tacit endorsement of certain aspects of the 
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Ahtisaari plan helps to this end, and indicates policy space for more 
integrative solutions.84 ‘Enclavization’ pushes Kosovo Serbs to look to 
Belgrade rather than Prishtina, and it does not address the issue of livelihood. 
According to one observer, Kosovo Serbs should have demanded a certain 
number of places at all levels of education, to signal commitment to future 
multi-ethnic Kosovo but also as a guarantee of jobs for Kosovo Serbs.85  
 
The Albanians and the Serbs 
 
Albanians and Serbs have been divided by issues concerning territory and 
identity, which were addressed in the Ahtisaari plan. They have been equally 
united by concerns for their wellbeing that were not included by the plan. The 
finalization of their status, which the Ahtisaari process was expected to bring, 
was implicitly linked to the improvement of the economic situation in Kosovo. 
The access to international financial institutions this would allow is one 
example. Nonetheless, the Ahtisaari plan has failed to live up to the 
expectations of ordinary Albanians and Serbs because it did not explicitly 
address their concerns about poverty, unemployment and Kosovo’s 
development in general. A member of an Albanian NGO wondered, ‘Why isn’t 
there a line in Ahtisaari which says here you build a factory and employ 
people?’86 Similarly, Kosovo Serbs have been preoccupied with their 
economic survival. They feel this concern has been inadequately addressed 
in the status process. The high Kosovo average unemployment rate is even 
higher among Kosovo Serbs.87 This has particularly affected the younger 
population. In many instances, bleak economic prospects, rather than 
interethnic tensions, have prompted Serbs to sell up and leave, as is the case 
in the multi-ethnic village of Bresje, near Kosovo Polje.88 In addition, the 
Serbs’ dependence on handouts has made them vulnerable to political 
pressure from Belgrade. For example, the medical centre in Mitrovica is a key 
employer of Kosovo Serbs. Jobs at this hospital have provided material 
security for the employees, but also ensured political loyalty to Belgrade.  
   
Conclusion 
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Besides confusion over the authorization of the EU’s mission and the role of 
the UN in Kosovo, the Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo raises serious questions 
about its legitimacy, understood in terms of acceptance. The plan’s human 
security analysis challenges the commonly accepted homogeneity in 
ethnically-defined Serb and Albanian positions. This article does not suggest 
that the Ahtisaari process could have produced a hitherto elusive Serb-
Albanian rapprochement on Kosovo’s final status. It does, however, contend 
that consideration of a plurality of views in each community and a multiplicity 
of their concerns in the process would have ensured a more auspicious start 
for Kosovo’s new international administrators. The process ought to have 
incorporated rather than sidelined the diversity of Kosovo Serb concerns, and 
recognized Belgrade’s role as a cause of insecurity for Kosovo Serbs. 
Likewise, it ought to have attempted to overcome the legacy of conflict, such 
as the ethnic border in Mitrovica, which while dividing Albanians and Serbs 
allows illegal interethnic collaboration to flourish. Lastly, the ICO could have 
built in a local monitoring/advising mechanism to legitimise its executive 
powers.  
Insofar as the state-building literature recognizes the necessity of 
building legitimacy from below in territories governed by international 
administrators, discussion of policy implications stops short with calls for local 
consultation and local ownership. These have been criticized for leading to 
the artificial creation of civil society and abrogation of responsibility; but they 
also fail to address defining features of post-conflict environments. A human 
security approach allows for reframing of the bottom-up aspect by engaging 
with the complexity of local constituencies and a range of concerns in the 
aftermath of conflict.  
This implies tackling actors and structures created during the conflict 
that obstruct a transition to peace. Neither is obvious when viewed from the 
top-down state perspective, but, nonetheless, they undermine the rule of law, 
distort economic development and hinder conflict resolution. Beneficiaries of 
conflict, that cause pervasive insecurity, are likely to be found among one’s 
own ethnic kin. While appearing as advocates of statehood, their actual 
interest is in delaying state-building. Ultimately, they are set to gain from the 
legitimacy gaps in IAs.    
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Without a democratic mandate, governance is at the forefront of 
legitimation of international administrators, attempting to compensate for the 
lack of ‘input’ legitimacy. Governance is more than the technocratic exercise 
of public administration and economic resource management. It is a 
‘relationship’ between the governors and the governed.89 As such, it relies on 
the governed having a stake in the process by having a ‘say’ in it. In the 
context of IAs, a transfer of powers from external to local authorities is only 
one part of the process, which is determined by effective provision of a range 
of entitlements, including human rights, employment opportunities, transitional 
justice and so on. Resonance with the diverse needs of ordinary persons will 
enhance their sense of security, and, in turn, confer belief critical for 
legitimation to the providers of these public goods whether external or local.  
The success of international administrators ultimately depends on 
making their presence redundant. They will be most legitimate when no longer 
needed. This entails the creation of a democratic, inclusive and self-
sustainable state. The human security perspective addresses the questions: 
who should be empowered and on what terms, and answers them from the 
bottom-up vantage point. It thus points the way towards the eventual creation 
of a legitimate state following the exit of international governors. In this sense, 
the individual perspective works for state building, rather than in opposition to 
it. It does not imply an exclusion of the state, but is its ‘healthy corrective’.90  
The human security perspective moves the debate forward by 
indicating how and on what terms to engage the grassroots, particularly in a 
murky post-conflict environment, in creating security for all through state 
building. Prioritizing the bottom-up perspective marks a return to the 
paradigm-shifting quality of human security as a concept and policy. In view of 
the challenges posed by global governance, the stronger the claim to 
legitimacy – understood in terms of acceptance by local constituencies, 
generated by reaching beyond nascent state structures, and mindful of 
conflict dynamics and its legacies – the greater the opportunity for 
international administrations to be a more potent instrument of state building, 
and, ultimately, conflict resolution.   
 
 20 
Acknowledgments 
 
This article draws on the author’s research for the Human Security Study 
Group convened by Professor Mary Kaldor and the ongoing project ‘Human 
Security in Kosovo’ at the Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London 
School of Economics and Political Science. The author thanks anonymous 
reviewers for their useful comments.  
 
NOTES 
 
1 See Table I in Kanti Bajpai, ‘Human Security: Concept and Management’, 
working paper, Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Studies (at: 
www.ciaonet.org/wps/baj01). 
2 Sabina Alkire, ‘Concepts of Human Security’, in Lincoln Chen et al., (eds) 
Human Insecurity in a Global World, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2003, pp.15–39. 
3 Bajpai (see n.1 above).  
4 Neil Cooper, ‘Review Article: On the Crisis of the Liberal Peace’, Conflict, 
Security & Development, Vol.7, No.4, pp.605-616, at p.615. 
5 Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha M. Chenoy, Human Security: 
Concepts and Implications, London: Routledge, 2007, pp.57–68. 
6 Roland Paris, 'Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air', International 
Security, Vol.26, No.2, 2001, pp.87–102. 
7 Marlies Glasius, ‘Human Security: From Paradigm Shift to 
Operationalization: Job Description for a Human Security Worker’, Security 
Dialogue, Vol.39, No.1, 2008, pp.31–54; Sandra J. MacLean et al., (eds), A 
 21 
 
Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralisms, 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006. 
8 Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, ‘New Threats to Human Security in the Era of 
Globalization’, in Chen (see n.2 above), pp.1–13; cf. Peter Uvin, ‘A Field of 
Overlaps and Interactions’, Security Dialogue, Vol.35, No.5, 2004, pp.352–3. 
9 Hugh Miall et al., Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Cambridge: Polity, 
1999, p.18. 
10 Sascha Werthes and Tobias Debiel, ‘Human Security on Foreign Policy 
Agendas: Introduction to Changes, Concepts and Cases’ pp.8–20, at p.18, 
(at: www.ciaonet.org/wps/idp/0001302/0001302.pdf). 
11 Mary Kaldor, Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and 
Intervention, Cambridge: Polity, 2007. 
12 Edward Mortimer, ‘International Administration of War-Torn Societies’, 
Global Governance, Vol.10, No.1, 2004, pp.7–14, at p.12. 
13 Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule 
and Reconstruction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
14 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Neotrusteeship and the Problem of 
Weak States’, International Security, Vol.28, No.4, 2004, pp.5–43. 
15 Simon Chesterman, You, the People: the United Nations, Transitional 
Administration, and State-building, Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004, pp.143–5; David Harland, ‘Legitimacy and Effectiveness in 
International Administrations’, Global Governance, Vol.10, No.1, 2004, pp.15–
19, at p.19. 
 22 
 
16 Michael Zürn, ‘Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems’, in David Held 
and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (eds) Global Governance and Public 
Accountability, Oxford: Blackwell, 2005, pp.136–63; Achim Hurrelmann et al., 
(eds) Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007.  
17 Jens Steffek, ‘The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse 
Approach’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol.9, No.2, 2003, 
pp.249–75. 
18 Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999, p.6. 
19 William Bain, Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the 
Obligations of Power, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.191. 
20 Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, London: Vintage, 2003. 
21 David Chandler, Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building, London: 
Pluto, 2006, p.190. 
22 Sally Morphet, ‘Current International Civil Administration: The Need for 
Political Legitimacy’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.9, No.2, 2002, pp.140–
62. 
23 Dominik Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of 
International Statebuilding, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
24 E.g., analyses by Caplan (see n.13 above), Chandler (see n. 21 above) and 
Zaum (see n. 23 above) are overwhelmingly based on interviews with 
international employees of IAs. 
 23 
 
25 Rodney Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State, Oxford: Clarendon, 
1990, p.27. 
26 Bernhard Knoll, ‘Legitimacy and UN-Administration of Territory’, German 
Law Journal, Vol.8, No.1, 2007, pp.39–56. 
27 Chesterman (see n.15 above), p.129. 
28 Zaum (see n.23 above), pp.238–9; Paddy Ashdown, Swords And 
Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century, London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 2007, Appendix B, pp.234–5. 
29 Béatrice Pouligny, Peace Operations Seen from Below: U.N. Missions And 
Local People, Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2006, p.86. 
30 Ibid,.pp.42–95. 
31 Press conference by the UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari Following the 
High Level meeting held in Vienna, 10 Mar. 2007 (at: www.unosek.org). 
32 ‘Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council’, UN doc., S/2007/168, 26 Mar. 2007, 
‘Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General on Kosovo’s future 
status’, p.2. 
33 Ibid. ‘Addendum: Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement’, Annex II: The Rights of Communities and their Members and 
Annex III: Decentralization. pp.18–21,22–31. 
34 Ibid. Annex V: Religious and Cultural Heritage, 38–43. 
35 Ibid. Annex IX: International Civilian Representative, Art.2, p.52. 
 24 
 
36 Susan Woodward, ‘Compromised Sovereignty to Create Sovereignty: Is 
Dayton a Futile Exercise or an Emerging Model’, in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.) 
Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Problematic Possibilities. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2001, pp.252–300. 
37 Renata Goldirova, ‘Kosovo to Aim for ‘Coordinated’ Declaration of 
Independence’, Euobserver, 7 Dec. 2007 (at: www.euobserver.com).  
38 Deklarata e Pavarësisë së Kosovës [Declaration of Kosovo’s 
Independence], 17 Mar. 2008, p.2 (at: www.assembly-kosova.org). 
39 A lifeline for isolated Serbs, Financial Times (London), 13 June 2008 (at: 
www.ft.com).   
40 ‘Sejdiu: EU mission shorter than UNMIK’, Koha Ditore (Prishtina), OSCE 
Monitor Final Edition, 25 Apr. 2008. 
41 Enver Hoxhaj, ‘The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation in Kosovo’, The 
Centre for the Study of Global Governance, Discussion Paper 39 (at: 
www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/DiscussionPapers/DP39.pdf). 
42 Author’s interview with an Albanian civil society representative dealing with 
governance, 7 Sept. 2007. 
43 Author’s interview with an UNMIK official, Prishtina, 7 Sept. 2007. 
44 Francesco Strazzari, ‘The Decade Horriblis: Organized Violence and 
Organized Crime along the Balkan Peripheries, 1991–2001’, Mediterranean 
Politics, Vol.2, No.2, 2007, pp.185–209; Michael Pugh, ‘Crime and capitalism 
in Kosovo’s transformation’, in Tonny Brems Knudsen and Carsten Bagge 
Laustsen, Kosovo between War and Peace, London: Routledge, 2006, 
 25 
 
pp.116–34; Cf. Prvoslav Karanovć, ‘Istrazivanje – Trgovina Srbija-Kosovo: Po 
sumama i gorama’ [Investigation – Kosovo-Serbia trade: Over forests and 
hills], Vreme (Belgrade), No.860, 28 June 2007 (at: www.vreme.com). 
45 Author’s interview with a representative of an Albanian ‘think-tank’, 6 Sept. 
2007. 
46 Iain King and Whit Mason, Peace at any Price: How the World Failed 
Kosovo, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006, p.251. 
47 Cf. Andrew Taylor, ‘“We are not asking you to hug each other, but we ask 
you to co-exist”: The Kosovo Assembly and the Politics of Co-existence’, The 
Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol.11, No.1, 2005, pp.105–37. 
48 Dana H. Allin, ‘Unintended Consequences-Managing Kosovo 
Independence’, in What Status for Kosovo?, Chaillot Paper 50, European 
Institute for Security Studies, Paris, Oct. 2001, pp.7–17, at p.9. 
49 Branislav Krstić, Kosovo izmedju istorijskog i etnickog prava [Kosovo 
between the historic and ethnic right], Beograd: Kuca vid, 1994.  
50 Nenad Lj. Stefanović, and Davor Konjikušić, ‘Izbori na Kosovu: Izadji i bori 
se’ [Kosovo elections: Participate and fight], Vreme, No.567, 15 Nov. 2001 (at: 
www.vreme.com). 
51 European Stability Initiative, ‘The Lausanne Principle: Multi-ethnicity, 
Territory and the Future of Kosovo’s Serbs’, Berlin/Pristina, 7 June 2004 (at: 
www.esiweb.org). 
52 Dafina Myrtaj, ‘Nuk kanë frike’ [They don’t fear], Express (Prishtina), 24 
Feb. 2008, pp.8–9. 
 26 
 
53 ‘Parallel Structures in Kosovo’, OSCE Mission in Kosovo and UNMIK, Oct. 
2003 (at: www.osce.org/documents/mik/2003/10/698_en.pdf). 
54 Jelena Aleksić and Tanja Matić, ‘Kosovo Serb Political Divisions Grow’, 
Balkan Insight, 25 Sept. 2006 (at: www.balkaninsight.com). 
55 Ljubiša Popović, ‘Srbijo, ne pomaži više!’, [Serbia, don’t help any more!] 
NIN (Belgrade), 4 Nov. 1999 (at: www.nin.co.yu). 
56 Author’s interview with a civil society member and political commentator, 
Prishtina, 7 Sept. 2007. 
57 Author’s interview with a member of the Unity Team, Prishtina, 6 Sept. 
2007. 
58 Gazmend Syla, ‘Public Perceptions of Decentralization’, in ‘Roundtable on 
Decentralization: Proceedings Report’, OSCE Monitor Final Edition, Prishtina, 
20 June 2007, p.19.   
59 Anna Matveeva and Wolf-Christian Paes, ‘The Kosovo Serbs: An Ethnic 
Minority Between Collaboration and Defiance’, Bonn International Centre for 
Conversion, Friedrich Naumann Foundation and Safeworld, June 2003, 
pp.29–30. 
60 Mufail Limani, ‘A po copëtohet Kosova?’ [Is Kosovo being partitioned?], 
Express, 27 Feb. 2008, at p.2. 
61 ‘Organizing against ethnic decentralization’, Vetëvendosje! Newsletter 91 
(Prishtina), 21 Apr. 2008. 
62 Refki Alija, ‘Odlično se slažemo’ [We get along well], Gradjanski glasnik 
(Prishtina), 20 Apr.-3 May 2007, p.6. 
 27 
 
63 Author’s interview with OSCE official, Prishtina, 7 Sept. 2007. 
64 The grassroots views were captured by ‘Kosovo Future Status Process: 
Knowledge–Attitudes–Practices (KAP) Survey’, Strategic Marketing 
Research, Belgrade, and Kosovo Institute for Policy Research and 
Development, Prishtina, 19 July 2006 (at: www.smmri.co.yu).  
65 ‘Problematic initiative of Pieter Feith’, Zëri (Prishtina), in OSCE Monitor 
Final Edition, 23 June 2008.   
66 ‘Public Information on Ahtisaari’s Settlement Document: Analyses and 
recommendations on Community Roundtables and Public Town Hall 
Meetings’, Advocacy Training & Resource Centre, Prishtina, 6 July 2007. 
67 Key Serbian Orthodox churches have been under NATO protection since 
1999, but did not have a special status as such.  
68 Interview (see n.57 above). According to the International Crisis Group the 
absence of Albanians’ input was due to their omission to provide a detailed 
proposal to Ahtisaari and his team. ‘Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the 
Ahtisaari Plan’, International Crisis Group, Report 182, 14 May 2007, p.18 
69 Interview (see n.45 above). 
70 ‘Kosovo does not Win Everything with Ahtisaari’s Plan’, Koha Ditore, 
OSCE Monitor Final Edition, 13 Aug. 2007.  
71 ‘Propast plana – državni interes’ [Failure of the plan – the state interest], 
Radio B92 (Belgrade), 28 Mar. 2007 (at: www.b92.net). 
72 Humanitarian aid from Serbia was suddenly withdrawn from dissenting 
individuals and their families.   
 28 
 
73 Author’s interview with Serb journalist in Kosovo, Prishtina, 7 Sept. 2007. 
74 Ibid. 
75‘ Kosovo: Kada će se Srbi dogovoriti’ [Kosovo: When will the Serbs agree], 
Radio B92, 17 Oct. 2005 (at: www.b92.net). . 
76 Anamari Repić, ‘Kosovski Srbi propustili ulogu u statusnom procesu’ 
[Kosovo Serbs without a role in the status process], Gradjanski glasnik 
(Prishtina), 1–14 Jun. 2007, p.8. 
77 ‘Kula Balkana’, Emisija Peščanik, [‘Balkan Tower’, Programme Peščanik] 
Radio B92, 23 Ap. 2008 (at:  www.b92.net).  
78 ‘Politički lideri kosovskih Srba ne podržavaju Samardžićev predlog 
sporazuma sa Unmikom’, [Kosovo Serb political leaders don’t support 
Samardžić’s draft agreement with UNMIK], Danas (Belgrade) 24 Mar. 2008 
(at: www.danas.co.yu); Refki Alija, ‘Prizren: Prhivatanje i odbijanje’ [Prizren: 
Accepting and rejecting], Gradjanski glasnik, 9–22 Feb. 2007, p.11. 
79 ‘Serbët e Pejës nuk kundërshtojnë’ [Peja Serbs don’t oppose], Express, 2 
Mar. 2008, p.8. 
80 ‘Serbs divided regarding parallel assembly and cooperation with EULEX’, 
Koha Ditore, OSCE Monitor Final Edition, 23 June 2008.  
81 ‘Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan’ (see n.68 above), 
pp.29–36. 
82 ‘Kosovo Human Security Brainstorming’, Minutes, Advocacy Training & 
Resource Centre, Prishtina, and LSE Enterprise, London, Batllava, 4–5 Mar. 
2008. 
 29 
 
83 ‘Coming to Terms with the Problem of Kosovo: The People’s Views from 
Kosovo and Serbia’, opinion poll by Colin Irwin for Kosovalajv, Prishtina, 
Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeastern Europe, 
Thessaloniki, and Medijski Centar Beta, Belgrade, 2006 (at: 
www.cdsee.org/pdf/kosovo_serbia_short_report.pdf). 
84 Cf. ‘Kosovo Serbs after the Declaration of Independence: The Right 
Momentum for Confidence Building Measures’, Kosovar Institute for Policy 
Research and Development, Prishtina, Policy Brief No.8, July 2008. 
85 Author’s interview with a Serb newspaper editor, Prishtina, 5 Sept. 2007. 
86 Author’s interview with a representative of a Klinë/Klina-based NGO, 
Prishtina, 5 Sept. 2007.  
87 Sonja Ristić and Zoran Ćulafić, ‘Delegacija Saveta bezbednosti na Kosovu’ 
[UNSC delegation in Kosovo], TV Danas i sutra, UNMIK production, 27 Apr. 
2007.  
88 Igor Milic, ‘Village for sale’, Balkan Insight, 25 Sept. 2006 (at: 
www.balkaninsight.com). 
89 Derick W. Brinkerhoff, ‘Introduction – Governance Challenges in Fragile 
States’, in Brinkerhoff (ed.), Governance in Post-Conflict Societies: Rebuilding 
Fragile States, London and New York: Routledge, 2007, pp.1–21, at p.18. 
90 S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, Human Security and the UN: A 
Critical History, Indianopolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006, p.246. 
 
